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The	EU’s	southern	member	states	have	set	the	stage
for	European	debt	mutualisation
The	Covid-19	outbreak	has	led	to	renewed	calls	for	debt	mutualisation	in	the	Eurozone.	Luuk	Molthof
writes	that	while	it	seemed	inconceivable	member	states	would	commit	to	genuine	debt	sharing	prior
to	the	crisis,	the	pandemic	has	proven	to	be	a	game-changer.	He	argues	Italy	and	Spain	have
successfully	portrayed	northern	member	states	as	lacking	in	European	solidarity,	framing	the	adoption
of	joint	debt	instruments	as	the	primary	prerequisite	for	saving	the	European	project.
Due	to	the	Covid-19	pandemic,	Europe	is	not	just	confronted	with	a	health	crisis	but	also	with	an	economic	crisis	of
an	unprecedented	scale.	During	a	video	summit	on	23	April,	EU	leaders	agreed	to	a	€540	billion	rescue	package
and	instructed	the	European	Commission	to	draw	up	a	proposal	for	a	recovery	fund	to	help	Europe	out	of	the
recession.	However,	the	summit	left	open	the	question	of	how	much	money	the	member	states	will	commit	to	the
recovery	and	how	they	intend	to	finance	it.
Italy	and	Spain	have	repeatedly	called	for	the	adoption	of	joint	debt	instruments	to	finance	the	recovery.	Yet	their
calls	have	been	met	with	stiff	resistance	from	the	Netherlands,	Germany,	Austria	and	Finland,	who	fear	the	creation
of	a	European	transfer	union.	Because	of	their	resistance,	it	seems	unlikely	that	the	Eurozone	will	adopt	a	genuine
form	of	debt	sharing	any	time	soon.	Nevertheless,	as	the	crisis	develops,	these	states	may	find	it	increasingly
difficult	to	stick	to	their	guns.
This	is	because,	unlike	during	the	Eurozone	crisis,	where	‘the	North’	held	the	upper	hand,	it	is	now	losing	out	to	‘the
South’	in	the	framing	of	the	appropriate	economic	response.	Northern	countries	more	or	less	successfully	framed
the	Eurozone	crisis	as	the	result	of	‘unsound’	economic	policy,	casting	the	(southern)	debtor	states	as	‘irresponsible
lenders’	and	the	(northern)	creditors	as	‘responsible	savers’.
Their	narrative	of	the	crisis	underlined	the	need	for	European	solidarity,	but	also	stressed	the	importance	of
individual	responsibility.	In	line	with	this	narrative,	Germany	and	others	argued	that	the	mutualisation	of	debt	would
only	exacerbate	the	moral	hazard	problem	on	the	part	of	the	debtor	states.	While	the	northern	countries	did	not
escape	accusations	of	showing	too	little	solidarity,	they	felt	little	pressure	to	change	their	position,	due	to	both	their
material	advantage	and	their	control	over	the	crisis	narrative.
Giuseppe	Conte	at	a	European	Council	meeting	in	February	2020,	Credit:	European	Union
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This	time,	however,	Germany	and	its	associates	have	struggled	in	the	‘communication	battle’.	In	the	wake	of	the
pandemic,	public	sympathy	has	been	drawn	toward	the	southern	countries,	who	have	been	hit	particularly	hard	and
who	have	framed	their	economic	troubles	as	being	caused	primarily	by	extraordinary	circumstances.
In	this	context,	it	is	no	longer	as	easy	for	the	North	to	cast	its	southern	partners	as	fiscally	irresponsible	debtors
whose	claim	to	European	solidarity	is	limited	–	even	if	some	countries	did	enter	this	crisis	in	an	already	unhealthy
financial	position.	In	fact,	when	they	do	attempt	to	portray	the	South	as	profligate,	such	as	when	Dutch	Finance
Minister	Wopke	Hoekstra	called	on	the	European	Commission	to	investigate	why	some	countries	did	not	have	the
necessary	financial	buffers	to	cope	with	the	crisis,	they	have	taken	a	lot	of	flak	from	their	European	partners	and	the
European	media.
Statements	like	Hoekstra’s	have	allowed	countries	such	as	Italy	and	Spain	to	successfully	portray	the	North	as
lacking	in	solidarity.	More	importantly,	however,	they	have	also	been	able	to	successfully	frame	European	debt
pooling,	and	eurobonds	in	particular,	as	the	number	one	expression	of	European	solidarity.	Much	of	the	European
media	have	copied	the	South’s	framing	of	the	debate	surrounding	joint	debt	instruments.	Even	a	lot	of	the
commentary	that	is	critical	of	debt	pooling	doesn’t	seem	to	question	its	symbolic	value.	Unlike	during	the	Eurozone
crisis,	then,	it	is	the	South	which	seems	to	be	winning	the	communication	battle.
This	has	increased	the	pressure	on	northern	countries,	if	not	to	accept	genuine	debt	mutualisation,	then	to	at	least
accept	far-reaching	measures	for	financial	assistance.	Their	promises	on	23	April	alleviated	the	pressure
somewhat,	but	this	crisis	is	far	from	over.	And	while	a	country	like	the	Netherlands,	for	instance,	may	not	mind
playing	the	bad	cop,	Germany,	in	particular,	will	be	much	more	susceptible	to	criticism	that	it	is	not	showing
sufficient	European	solidarity.
In	fact,	in	an	apparent	change	of	approach,	Merkel’s	government	signalled	its	support	for	the	issuing	of	temporary
EU	bonds.	While	such	bonds	would	only	be	provisional	and	would	likely	not	cover	existing	debts,	if	adopted,	they
would	nevertheless	set	an	important	precedent.	Although	the	genuine	mutualisation	of	European	debt	is	still	a	long
way	off,	due	to	Covid-19	and	the	South’s	effective	crisis	narrative,	its	implementation	is	no	longer	as	inconceivable
as	it	once	was.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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